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tions would seem to be those committed to other than judicial organs
of government, not in terms excluding judicial control, but with respect
to issues so distinctly political in character that a court should regard
it as improper to seek to exercise control.n Essentially it seems that
the action of a state legislature in passing upon a proposed constitutional amendment is governed by considerations of public policy and
expediency, and may be political per se. At any rate, the refusal of
the United States Supreme'Court to look behind the certification in
Leser v. Garnett,u and the fact that Congress has heretofore taken
upon itself the task of determining such questions,2 lend weight to a
position that the Kentucky Court decided a political question in the
principal case.
It is submitted that the Kentucky case" cannot be supported
(1) becausd historical precedent, reason, and authority show that a
rejection of a proposed amendment cannot preclude a subsequent valid
ratification, (2) a fortiori rejection by more than one-fourth of the
states cannot operate to withdraw the amendment from the states,
(3) the proposed amendment was still before the states, no reasonable
time having passed since its proposal, (4) the decision was gratuitous,
certification of the ratification being fait accompli and merely evidentiary, and the Secretary of State of the United States not being
subject to mandamus, and (5) the question is one primarily political,
and therefore not properly subject to judicial determination.
STEVE W11Trr.

HOMESTEADS-INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT IN ASYLUM OR
PENITENTIARY AS CONSTITUTING AN ABANDONMENT.
In a recent Kentucky case,' the Court of Appeals handed down a
decision to the effect that a homestead acquired under the homestead
laws was not abandoned by enforced confinement in the penitentiary.
stein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation (1925), 39 Harv. L.
Rev. 221; Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296.
03 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States (1929),
1326; see also Dodd, supra, n. 24; Weston, supra, n. 24.
"Dodd, Non-Enforcible Provisions of Constitutions (1931), 80
U. Pa. L. Rev. 54, 85.
258 U. S. 130 (1922).
Supra, n. 9.
nWise, et al. v. Chandler, et al., 270 Ky. 1, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024
(1937).
1 Clolinger v. Callahan, 204 Ky. 33, 263 S. W. 700 (1924)-Defendant
and his son were convicted of killing A, and sent to the penitentiary.
A's widow and children sued defendant under Sec. 4, Ky. Stat., and
garnisheed B bank in which defendant had some money. A alleged
that the money was the proceeds from the sale of his homestead. Held,
defendant had the right to sell his homestead and reinvest the proceeds in another homestead, and his homestead rights were not abandoned by his enforced confinement in prison.

STUDENT NOTES
Kentucky Statutes, Section 1702, allows a debtor a one thousand dollar
($1,000.00) homestead exemption. The manner in which homesteads
are lost or waived is varied. Whether involuntary confinement in
an asylum or penitentiary constitutes or effects an abandonment is
2
our problem here. The case of £lolinger v. UaZlahat is one of the few
decisions in Kentucky in which the problem is raised.
Whether or not there has been an abandonment of a homestead
will depend on whether or not there has been a manifestation of an
Intention to abandon it. 3 What is and what is not an abandonment
depends, therefore, largely on the facts of each particular case
In
Himith v. Moss/ the court said: "Temporary absence from the property claimed as a homestead will not operate as an abandonment of
the right, if the claimant entertains an ever-present intention and
Other
purpose of returning to the property as a permanent home."
7
Kentucky decisions are in accord.
Specific legislation has been provided in many states as to aban8
donment of homesteads, though there is none present in Kentucky.
In order to constitute an abandonment of the homestead, the
removal must be voluntary and not under compulsion. An abandonment is not occasioned by a removal or temporary absence caused by
some casualty or necessity, if there is an intention of returning as
2204 Ky. 33, 263 S. W. 700 (1924).
'Smith
v. Moss, 211 Ky. 226, 277 S. W. 245 (1925).
4
Mattingly v. Berry, 94 Ky. 544, 15 K. L. R. 288, 23 S. W. 215
(1893); Campbell v. Potter, 16 K. L. R. 535, 29 S. W. 139 (1895);
Central Asylum v. Craven, 17 K. L. R. 667, 98 Ky. 105, 32 S. W. 291
(1895); Carroll v. Dawson, 20 K. L. R. 349, 103 Ky. 736, 46 S. W. 222
(1898); Cin. L. T. W. Co. v. Thompson, 20 K. L. R. 1439, 105 Ky. 627,
49 S. W. 446 (1899); White v. Roberts, 23 K. L. R. 2187, 112 Ky. 788,
66 S. W. 758 (1902); Herring v. Johnston, 24 K. L. R. 1940, 72 S. W. 793
(1903); Riddle v. Fannin, 24 K. L. R. 1737, 72 S. W. 290 (1903);
American Nat. Bank v. Mathews, 124 S. W. 811 (Ky., 1910); Purdy v.
Melton, 164 Ky. 749, 176 S. W. 346 (1915); Louisville Tobacco Co. v.
Calvert, 180 Ky. 718, 203 S. W. 567 (1918); Conway v. Reed, 193 Ky.
287, 235 S. W. 747 (1921); Smith v. Moss, 211 Ky. 226, 277 S. W. 245
(1925); Elliott v. Argenbright, 221 Ky. 763, 299 S. W. 957 (1927);
Tylers' Exrs, v. Williamson, 237 Ky. 579, 36 S. W. (2d) 34 (1931);
Williams v. Evans' Admrs., 247 Ky. 105, 56 S. W. (2d) 710 (1933);
Richardson v. Richardson, 252 Ky. 235, 67 S. W. (2d) 7 (1934); Brewer
v. Brewer, 268 Ky. 625, 105 S. W. (2d) 582 (1937).
r211 Ky. 226, 277 S. W. 245 (1925).
211 Ky. 226 at 231, 277 S. W. 245 at 247.
'Taree v. Spriggs, 149 Ky. 20, 147 S. W. 754 (1912); Frazer v.
Potter, 150 Ky. 127, 150 S. W. 19 (1912); Farmers' and Traders' Bank
v. Childers, 150 Ky. 719, 150 S. W. 840 (1912); Baker v. Estridge, 154
Ky. 659, 157 S. W. 1080 (1913); Conway v. Reed, 193 Ky. 287, 235 S. W.
747 (1921); Clolinger v. Callahan, 204 Ky. 33, 263 S. W. 700 (1924).
"Ala. Code (Mayfield, 1923), Sec. 7914; Ariz. Rev. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928), Sec. 1734; Calif. Civ. Code (Deering), Sec. 1243, 44;
Idaho Ann. Code (Official Edition, 1932); Sec. 54-1007; La. Gen. Stat.
(Dart, 1932), Sec. 3809; Minn. Gen. Stat. (Harvey, 1923), Sec. 8341;
Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), Sec. 337; Mont. Rev. Code (Choate), Sec. 6951;
Okla. Stat. (Eagin and Eaton, 1931), Sec. 9663; Tex. Stat. (Vernon,
1936), Sec. 4618; Utah Rev. Stat. (1933), Sec. 38-0-7; Wash. Code
(Pierce, 1929), Sec. 7866, 67.
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soon as circumstances will permit. A casualty or necessity may consist of an imprisonment or confinement in either penitentiary or
asylum.' Certainly, in an involuntary or compulsory absence there Is
no intent at the time of the absence to relinquish any rights, and
moreover, there is a present and continuing intent to return. Residence away from the land is ordinarily not permissible for long periods
of time, but under the special circumstances of involuntary confinement the residence away from the land is not such as would effect an
abandonment. A person imprisoned under operation of law does not
thereby change his residence.10 In an early Supreme Court case," the
court said:
"It is only under special circumstances that residence away
from the land is permissible. The settler may be excused for
temporary absences caused by well founded apprehensions of
violence, by sickness, by presence of an epidemic, by judicial compulsion, or by engagement in the military or naval service. Except
in such cases, the requirement of a continuous residence on the
part of the settler is imperative.""2
Let us consider separately the cases of other jurisdictions where
claimants of homesteads were either confined to a prison, or placed In
an asylum because of insanity.
In the few cases in which involuntary confinement in the penitentiary was considered, the cases are strongly in accord that the
Imprisonment did not constitute an abandonment of the property
rights acquired under the Homestead Laws0 In Miflett v. Pearson,4
A was the owner and occupied the premises in question with his wife,
as their homestead. On March 16, 1916, he shot and killed his wife,
and was arrested and lodged in jail until June, when he was convicted
and sentenced to the state prison for life. Held, that the premises
continued to be his homestead. The court said:
"As a general rule of law persons under legal disability or
restraint, or persons in want of freedom, are incapable of losing
or gaining a residence by acts performed by them under the control of others. There must be an exercise of volition by persons
free from restraint and capable of acting for themselves, in order
to acquire or lose a residence. A person imprisoned under operation of law does not thereby change his residence.""5
129 C. J., p. 937.
"Millett v. Pearson, 143 Minn. 187, 173 N. W. 411 (1919).
n Bohall v. Dilla, 114 U. S. 47, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 782 (1885).
12114 U. S. 47 at 51.
""Withers v. Love, 72 Kan. 140, 3 L. R. A. (n. s.) 514, 83 Pac. 204
1905); Clolinger v. Callahan, 204 Ky. 33, 263 S. W. 700 (1924); Anderson v. Anderson, 5 Land. Dec. Dept. Int. 6; Garner v. Freeman, 118
La. 184, 118 Am. St. Rep. 361, 42 So. 767 (1907); Lindsey v. Holly, 105
Miss. 740, 63 So. 222 (1913); Mdillett v. Pearson, 143 Minn. 187, 173
N. W. 411 (1919); Huffman v. Smyth, 47 Ore. 573, 114 Am. St. Rep. 938,
84 Pac. 80 (1906); Bryant v. Freeman, 134 Tenn. 169, 183 S. W. 731
(1915).
14143 Minn. 187, 173 N. W. 411 (1919).
"173 N. W. (Minn.) 411 at 412.

STUDENT NOTES
In Anderson v. Anderson," claimant had settled on the tract in
controversy some ten (10) or twelve (12) years prior to the contest,
and had continuously resided there when he was arrested, and subsequently convicted and committed to the penitentiary for life. His
claim was then contested on the ground of abandonment, but the contest was dismissed. Secretary Lamar, who rendered the opinion,
said:
"Anderson's absence from the land was by judicial compulsion, which would certainly be a valid excuse for temporary absence."
1
In Garner v. Freeman,
T plaintiff sought to enjoin the seizure and
sale of certain personal property as exempt under the state Homestead
Laws. Defendant's answer averred plaintiff's confinement in prison,
and argued that since plaintiff was not in actual possession of the
property at the time of the seizure, he could not claim the benefit of
the Homestead Law. The court said: "Plaintiff did not voluntarily
abandon his possession, and his incarceration did not deprive him of
any of his property rights."1'
In Lindsey v. Holly," appellant owned a tract of land at the time
he married, which he occupied as a homestead. He was subsequently
confined in a jail. Upon his release, he sued in ejectment for possession of the premises. Held, that he had lost no rights in the property
by his confinement in the jail. The court based its decision on the
fact that since the removal of the appellant was by necessity there
could not be an abandonment, insofar as an abandonment implied a
voluntary act of leaving the homestead property. In Huffman v. Smyth,-" plaintiff had homestead rights in the lands
In question. He was sent to prison for ten years, and then pardoned.
In the meantime, his wife had divorced him and remarried. He sued
for possession of the premises. Held, that his imprisonment did not
effect an abandonment. The court said:
"If a settler has established an actual residence and made improvements on the land, then his removal therefrom and enforced
absence by reason of conviction for a crime will not work an
abandonment. The reason for this rule is doubtless twofold: First,
that residence and abandonment are each determined in part by
intention, and it cannot be said that the established residence
carries with it the intention to abandon that from which he has
been unwillingly removed. Secondly, that abandonment is something more than the relinquishment of possession. It must be the
voluntary relinquishment
of possession united with an intention
to abandon.' ' 2
In Withers v. Love," plaintiff acquired a homestead and lived
there with his wife and children. The wife became insane and was
" 5 Land Dec. Dept. Int. 6.
"118 La. 184, 42 So. 767 (1907).
1842 So. (La.) 767 at 769.
19105 Miss. 740, 63 So. 222 (1913).
63 So. (Miss.) 222 at 223.
147 Ore. 573, 84 Pac. 80 (1906).
"84 Pac. (Ore.) 80 at 82.
2172 Kan. 140, 83 Pac. 204 (1905).
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committed to an asylum. Subsequently, plaintiff was imprisoned for
a convicted crime. On his release, he claimed his homestead, and the
court upheld his claim. The court mentioned that since plaintiff's
civil rights were suspended during his sentence and confinement, the
involuntary absence should not be given the effect of an abandonment.Y It Is interesting to note that in this case both insanity and
imprisonment in a penitentiary are present. The wife was insane and
the husband a convicted criminal.
In the cases of confinement to an asylum because of Insanity, the
courts are again strongly in accord that there is no abandonment,
because the absence is involuntary, and the person confined is incapable
of any intention in the matter.2 In the case of Lewis v. Lewis,," a husband deserted his wife, who, becoming Insane, was committed to an
asylum. Held, that her absence because of the committment was not
an abandonment thereof so that his deed of the homestead, not signed
and separately acknowledged by her, passed no title, and she was,
therefore, entitled to possession. The court said:
"But she (the insane wife) did not leave it voluntarily; she
was adjudged insane, and removed by force, tho in accordance
with law; hence, this case presents the question: Does such a
leaving constitute an abandonment by the wife? We hold that it
does not. Actual occupancy in such cases is not required to preserve the homestead rights of the wife whose husband has abandonde her and absconded, leaving her without aid or assistance
from him in her sad and unfortunate condition. It would be unconscionable to hold that he could, by such inhuman conduct,
deprive her of the only source of support which he had left her.
- Hence, involuntary or compulsory abandonment of or absence
from the homestead will not be an abandonment or a forfeiture
or waiver of the homestead rights."-"
In several earlier Kentucky cases, the same result was reached
by the Court of Appeals. In National Loan Association v. Maloney,"
R died the owner of a house and lot, leaving a widow and infant
children occupying the premises. A creditor obtained a judgment of
sale of the property subject to the widow's right to homestead. L, one
of the heirs, purchased it and executed a five hundred dollar ($500.00)
mortgage upon it to appellant. The widow was an incurable lunatic
confined to an asylum, and all of the children were over twenty-one
83 Pac. (Kan.) 204 at 207.
Lewis v. Lewis, 201 Ala. 112, 77 So. 406 (1917); Way v. Scott,
118 Iowa 197, 91 N. W. 1034 (1902); Natl. Loan Assn. v. Maloney, 22
K. L. R. 1094, 60 S. W. 12 (1900); Holburn v. Pfanmiller, 24 K. L. R.
1613, 114 Ky. 831, 71 S. W. 940 (1903); Eastern Insane Asylum v.
Cottle, 143 Ky. 719, 137 S. W. 235 (1911); Alton Mercantile Co. v.
Spindel, 42 Okla. 210, 140 Pac. 1168 (1914); Flynn v. Hancock, 35 Tex.
Civ. App. 395, 80 S. W. 245 (1904); Speer v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 132
Am. St. Rep. 896, 119 S. W. 86 (1909); Curry v. Wilson, 45 Wash. 19,
87 Pac. 1065 (1906).
2201 Ala. 112, 77 So. 406 (1917).
77 So. (Ala.) 406 at 408.
22 K. L. R. 1094, 60 S. W. 12 (1900).

STUDENT NOTES

(21) years of age, and not residing upon the property. It was contended that the widow had abandoned her homestead right. Held,
that an abandonment under the circumstances did not amount to an
abandonment of her right.
In Holburn v. Pfaizmiller,2' P died intestate, an inmate of the state
insane asylum, where he had been admitted as a pauper patient. He
owned a small piece of property in Louisville, worth seven or eight
After P's death, the asylum had
hundred dollars ($700 or $800).
X appointed as administrator, and brought this action against P's heirs
to subject the land to payment of the asylum fees. Held, that the
property was not subject to the claim, as it was the homestead of P
until his death, although he had been removed from it on account of
his lunacy.
In Eastern Insane Asylum v. Cottle,-" the state tried to subject the
lunatic's land to the satisfaction of its claim for debtor's maintenance
in the asylum. The debtor had homestead property when committed
to the asylum. His wife had died and the children married, leaving
the homestead, The debtor was an incurable lunatic and would never
occupy the homestead again, yet, the court held that this was not a
termination of the homestead exemption.
The homestead statute should be liberally construed and enforced
in favor of the claimant, and with this view the Kentucky courts are
in full accord.:
There is even more reason to favor the claimant in
the cases of involuntary confinement to a penitentiary or an insane
asylum. The rules for these decisions are based on sound reason. To
constitute an abandonment, there must be a voluntary absence from
2
the homestead, coupled with an intent to abandon.z In the case of
involuntary confinement in a penitentiary, both elements are lacking.
There is a compulsory departure forced by the law, with no intent on
the part of the convicted person to abandon the homestead. In the
case of insanity, we have the same involuntary compulsion added to the
fact that the person who is insane is incapable of any Intention in the
matter." It is submitted, therefore, that since the elements of voluntary absence and intent to abandon are both lacking, confinement in a
penitentiary or insane asylum does not effect abandonment of a homestead."
STEvEN T. BLADEK.

114 Ky. 831, 71 S. W. 940 (1903).
143 Ky. 719, 137 S. W. 235 (1911).
710 (1933);
' Williams v. Evans' Admr., 247 Ky. 105, 56 S. W. (2d)
Richardson v. Richardson, 252 Ky. 235, 67 S. W. (2d) 7 (1934);
Brewer v. Brewer, 268 Ky. 625, 105 S. W. (2d) 582 (1937).
'- Supra, n. 13.
Supra, n. 25.
"All italics in extracts from cases are writer's.

K. L. J.-S

